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Introduction
To consider the relationship of feminism, capitalism and corporation law is a
daunting task for the reason that it requires a reconsideration of first principles. What
does a feminist perspective have to offer an analysis of the American business
corporation and its place in our capitalist economy? How might such a perspective
generate original research in the area of corporation law? Would a more "feminist"
corporation necessarily be a less profitable one? If feminist law reforms came at a net
economic cost to firms or shareholders (which is not the foreseeable result, necessarily)
might the proposed law reforms be justifiable, on the basis of net social gains,
nevertheless?
Part I of this prolegomenon first proposes certain axioms for a feminist approach
to corporation law scholarship. These "feminist propositions" are intended merely to
commence discussion, rather than to constrain it. Part II presents a research agenda that
is, it is hoped, consistent with feminist values and concerns.
Part I: A Feminist Perspective
What essential set of principles or common outlook might form the basis of a
feminist perspective on corporation law? The question is immediately controversial, of
course. Nevertheless, consistent with the idea that "the perfect" should not be the enemy
of "the good," it is worth risking controversy in proposing a set of common principles
that might support a feminist analysis of capitalism and corporation law. In working
through these principles, it becomes immediately evident that at the level of theory, a
feminist approach has much in common with a generally progressive or left-leaning
orientation. It is anticipated, however, that a feminist orientation would lead, in its
application, to the analysis of substantive areas of corporate conduct that are particularly
of concern to women and proponents of womens' equality and womens' rights.
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In regard to the latter point, the research project described in Part II does not
expressly address womens' rights in relation to corporate conduct. Its analysis and
insights are intended, however, to facilitate law reform that would enhance norms of
democratic participation within corporate firms, including greater responsiveness to the
needs and interests of workers. To the extent that a more democratic, egalitarian and.
thus, worker-friendly firm resulted, and/or if the law reforms discussed below were to
give rise to a greater sharing of the corporate surplus with workers, women would
foreseeably experience a net benefit, both in economic and extra-economic terms. [n.b.:
statistical information on women as shareholder claimants versus women as workers..]
Axiom #1.

A feminist perspective on capitalism and corporate law might

proceed upon the premise that economic transacting is merely one form, one subset of
the larger category of human social relations. As Karl Polanyi stated in The Great
Transformation, "The outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological
research is that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships." [p.
46] In this regard, the broader predicament of the human condition (including bounded
rationality, inter alia) and human social needs must be considered, must be taken
seriously, in thinking about the interests and concerns of corporate constituents (i.e.,
shareholders, labor and management -- and potentially others). Neither psychology nor
sociology, nor the other human sciences, can be regarded as exogenous to the study of
business and capitalism.
Such an expanded focus would validate, for example, the possibility that certain
investors might value the opportunity (or "right") to make informed choices (i.e. a right
to receive full, accurate information) vis a vis the uses and results of their invested
capital, independent of attendant pecuniary gains or losses. It would also validate the
notion that investors may be motivated by concerns for fairness and democratic process,
in addition to more narrowly instrumental, pecuniary motivations. Certainly, Tom Tyler's
(psychological) research on "procedural justice" suggests that this is the case. A feminist
orientation towards corporation law need not be critical of arrangements facilitating
wealth creation - and Tyler's work validates the notion that feminist corporate reforms
facilitating greater fairness, egalitarianism and democratic processes would not
foreseeably result in net economic losses (and might indeed portend the opposite). As a
core principle, then, a feminist approach to the analysis of capitalism and corporation law
would oppose the notion that distributional considerations can be separated from, or can
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be regarded as secondary to goals of wealth creation or "allocative" efficiencies.
Axiom #2.

A feminist perspective is antithetical to claims based on fixed

categories and historic right. It is suspicious of zero-sum reasoning and the common
scholarly tendency to cast choices in terms of deadening, binary oppositions
(efficient/inefficient, capitalist/socialist, private(property) /public(property). In this
regard, for example, the property law scholarship of Carol Rose and most recently
Michael Heller (See, e.g., The Liberal Commons, Yale Law Journal, with H. Dagan), in
which "the commons" is proposed as an alternative, intermediate concept to "public"
versus "private" land constructs, may be helpful in countering the conclusions and
momentum generated by viewing the corporation as the private property of its
shareholders.
Axiom #3.

A feminist perspective takes seriously both the study of social

norms and social institutions (including those having to do with economic activity, such
as corporations), without reifying them. That is, norms and institutions are to be viewed
as being at the same time both powerful (in their capacity to structure and thus influence
human behavior) and malleable (in being subject to legal and practical evolution as a
result of theoretical innovation. In this regard, the feminist reconstruction of the
institution of "the corporation" may not be so foreign to this scholarship's analytical and
ideological reconstruction of "the family."
Consistent with this focus, for example, one would question why the "nexus of
contracts" understanding of the corporation, while it has endorsed the contractual basis of
the firm (and thus elided the issue of the purpose or effects of the corporation qua
institution), has all but ignored the "nexus" part. Although the "nexus of contracts"
school of thought has acknowledged the superficial interrelatedness of corporate
"contracts" (for example, that debtholders' covenants protect them from a board of
directors' potential decision to subject the firm to enhanced risk), it has failed to take
seriously the interdependence of corporate co-venturers as a potential source of positive
gains. This failure to take seriously the synergies that enhanced trust and mutual
recognition might produce is more surprising in light of Ronald Coase's explanation of
the motives for organizing economic activity within firms (as opposed to through
isolated, market transactions). Thus, a feminist approach would take the "nexus" part of
the nexus of contracts paradigm at least as seriously as the contractarian part in defining
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corporate law's role in optimizing concerted action among management, labor and the
contributors of capital.
Axiom #4

Underlying this sensitivity to the role and influence of social

norms and social institutions is a commitment to the view that theory matters. A feminist
approach declines to conflate what exists with what is optimal (or necessarily freely
chosen); and it assumes that there is no pre-theoretic, pre-political position. This is
crucially important in opening new vistas in corporation law because mainstream
corporation law scholarship, with its law and economics orientation, has represented
itself as being "atheoretic" - as if "the market" is natural, pre-theoretic and thus
apolitical. A feminist approach to the study of corporation law and capitalism would
reject the "naturalness" or inevitability or "pre-political" nature of current market-based
arrangements (including the accepted notion that there is something fundamental about
the idea that capital hires labor). In analyzing individual human beings' choices as they
interact with firms and in the broader capitalist economy (as well as the political
institutions that facilitate current economic organization), a feminist approach remains
alive to the understanding that theory inhabits us -- whether or not we are aware of it
consciously. [See, e.g., Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, "But if political
philosophy is unrealizable in one sense, it is unavoidable in another. This is the sense in
which philosophy inhabits the world from the start; our practices and institutions are
embodiments of theory." Preface, ix.]
Axiom #5

A feminist perspective rejects the mainstream, law and

economics norm that individuals are atomized, self-seeking, rational "utility"
maximizers. In this regard, it takes issue with the conservative branch of utilitarianism
(i.e. one which rejects value pluralism) and with neo-classical economics. In the
alternative, a feminist perspective may be compatible with certain forms of egalitarian
liberalism, at the same time that it stands in opposition to libertarian liberalism.
Ultimately, in it's analysis of corporations and capitalism, feminism's most natural
philosophical ally may be (some version of) communitarian thought. [n.b. Carlin Meyer's
objections, inter alia)
In charting a feminist research agenda for corporation law, these axioms should
be addressed in analyzing (i) the distinct interests of "the firm," as opposed to individual
sets of claimants (ii) shareholders' relations inter se and with management (iii) the
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relative claims and prerogatives of the entire range of corporate claimants - viz
management (the board and executive officers), capital (whether debt.or equity) and
labor and (iv) the expectations and entitlements of investors in securities markets.

Part Two:
Feminism. Capitalism and Political Theory in the American Law of Corporations
Introduction
What does political theory have to offer an analysis of the American business
corporation and a feminist orientation thereto? This piece envisions a comprehensive
revisiting of the construction and significance of American corporation law in relation to
feminist principles and political theory; it surveys both the states' corporation codes and
the fiduciary case law. The central premise of the piece is that political philosophy is
inseparable not only from law in general, but from both the existing construction (and
potential reformulation) of corporation law in particular. Some version of political
philosophy inhabits the corporate form and the legal and political structures and
institutions that support it. That said, American corporation law's theoretic commitments
remain murky. They have, for too long, been obscured by the law and economics
paradigm in which market arrangements are represented as natural, pre-political and
atheoretic.
What happens if the corporate form, and in particular, the particular creature of
the American public corporation, is analyzed in relation to the dominant paradigms of
contemporary political theory - that is, utilitarianism, liberalism and communitarianism?
Does one theory fit the corporation laws that we have more than another? What corporate
attributes or what laws or rules or standards would have to change to make the business
corporation more "true" to any of these philosophies? What types of gains and losses
would likely arise if law reforms reconfigured the American law of corporations
according to any of these philosophies?
Part I Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the dominant political paradigm underlying
the law and economics critique of the corporation, which is to say mainstream
corporation law scholarship. Within this tradition, the corporation (or more generically

5

"firm") is posited as being the private property of the shareholders. Under scrutiny, the
notion of the firm being a private body is constructed, within this discourse, in
tautological terms. That is, the firm is regarded as private because, it is contended,
individuals are able to maximize their utility through individualized contracting in private
arrangements. Because individualized bargaining, it is argued, is the basis for the
maximization of utility (by definition), the firm must be private.
This view of the corporation also connects up with fundamental neo-classical
economic norms in which financial capital is understood to "hire" labor. The accepted
wisdom that capital hires labor was of great concern to the founders of the American
republic, who saw the vulnerability of wage labor to (at least) economic enslavement and
political coercion. Jefferson, certainly, regarded private land ownership as crucial to the
maintenance of political liberty. Nevertheless, the private property basis of the
corporation (or of political liberty, for that matter) is not to be taken for granted.
Ultimately, the concept of the corporation as the private property of its
shareholders is tenable only if one assumes that 'state ownership' is the alternative to
"private" property. Because a shift to viewing the firm as "collective property" owned by
all is surely to radical, the "private" nature of the firm is reinforced. Within this binary
construction, corporations are surely more assimilable into the category of private
property than public - if one assumes that the latter term implies that the firm is an
agency, an extension of the state.
However, recent innovations in both corporate finance and in the legal academic
literature on theories of property undermine the absoluteness of the claim that the firm
"is" the private property of the shareholders. In the field of corporate finance, as Frank
Partnoy has demonstrated unequivocally in his writing on financial derivatives,
debtholders can quite plausibly be regarded as owners of the firm who have sold an
option to the shareholders, exercisable contingent on certain indicia of (positive)
financial profitability being met. Conversely, the shareholders can be regarded as the
owners, who, analogously, have a put to sell the firm to the debtholders in less happy
financial circumstances. Taking Partnoy's configurations seriously, the lesson learned
from understanding derivative financial instruments, is that ":ownership," in relation to
the corporation, is a highly malleable concept. Assignment of "ownership" status
shareholders, as opposed to debtholders is arbitrary and conventional. Scholars may
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prefer the idea of shareholders as being the owners in part because it is so longstanding,
and in part because it may be more difficult to conceive of the firm without shareholders
than without debtholders (although venture capital arrangements are making this less
difficult to imagine, in fact).
Recent innovation within the theoretic literature on property law also makes the
concept of the firm as the private property of its shareholders less tenable. In particular,
the evolving notion of the "liberal commons" provides an appealing and highly plausible
alternative heuristic for conceptualizing the corporate person. The "liberal commons" is
not to be confused with "open access" property. Rather the common is "open access" in
relation to the accepted participants, and private property vis a vis third parties. The
advantage of conceiving of the corporate person as "liberal commons" is that it captures
the intuitive understanding that the multiple corporate constituents can prosper,
optimally, only in conditions of trust and collaboration, that is through joint, concerted
action (or at least in the absence of opportunism). If either shareholders, debtholders,
labor or management engages in opportunism, indeed if there is only a pervasive fear or
expectation of opportunism, then returns to all corporate constituencies will be reduced.
In addition, the innovation of the "liberal" commons attempts to reconcile the
accommodation of individual interests, Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the
commons notion, for the American business corporation is determining who is on the
inside of the commons, and who is on the outside.
The historically mainstream understanding of shareholder primacy, in which the
corporate entity is conceived of as the private property of the shareholders is supported
by the relative absence of the discussion of non-shareholder constituencies within the
states' corporation codes, and the fact that fiduciary obligations are currently, absent
extraordinary circumstances such as insolvency, enforceable through derivative suits
only by shareholder plaintiffs. The import of the presence of concerns relevant to
shareholders (and not debtholders or workers) within the states' corporation statutes and
the fiduciary case law is less persuasive than one might assume, however. State
corporation law may "cater" to shareholders' interests on the theory that they are more
prone to problems of collective action than are contributors of debt capital or workers. At
least historically, workers had considerable opportunity to be represented to management
through unions. Banks and holders of corporate notes were represented through their
lawyers. Only subscribers to public debt securities were, potentially, as dispersed as
7

shareholders - but such debtholders are not infrequently institutions, and thus more
capable of organizing themselves to protect their interests through contract. Furthermore,
Congress intervened, through the mechanism of the Trust Indenture Act, to make sure
that public debtholders would not be subject to unfair expropriation or other pathologies
of constrained collective actions.
In fact, the rights afforded corporate shareholders, through the state corporation
statutes and the fiduciary case law are far more limited than they appear at first blush.
The state codes say nothing about the primacy of shareholders' interests in relation to
firm governance. The promise of shareholder elections for directors is limited by
corporations' ability to stagger the board (into four classes in New York, so that directors
would ordinarily be subject to election only every fourth year, and removable, consistent
therewith, only for cause), shareholders' limited occasions for action, beyond the annual
meeting (that is their constrained ability to act by written consent in many cases and their
failure to obtain a right to call a special meeting by operation of law). Shareholder voting
on fundamental corporate acts and transactions (such as mergers, sales of assets and
certificate amendments) is also highly restricted and dependent on managerial assent.
Again, utilitarianism has provided the most significant, justificatory philosophy
for current corporate arrangements. Yet utilitarianism's usefulness to proponents of the
private property/contractarian/shareholder primacy way of thinking is not as self evident
as scholars have assumed. Utilitarianism says nothing about precisely what value is to be
maximized. Should economic values (i.e. short term financial profit) be the exclusive
metric, or are values such as security, autonomy, longer-term welfare gains (including
profits) and concern for the generation of externalities of significance in considering
corporate arrangements -- even those relevant to shareholders? Law and economics
writing has not allowed for plural values, but the analysis of corporate arrangements
along feminist lines forces the question into the open.
Utilitarianism, furthermore, does not resolve the "us versus them" problem of
corporation law, as stated above. If we take utilitarianism seriously, it offers no
justification for making the maximization of shareholder utility (even assuming that were
monolithic, which is already problematic, as stated above) the sole or even preeminent
criteria for structuring corporate arrangements. If maximizing utility is the concern, then
shouldn't the project be to maximize the most utility for the most actors, and not merely
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or even primarily shareholders? What prior claim do shareholder have to having their
utility maximized at the expense of other contributors of long term capital or firm
specific resources? Taking utilitarianism seriously would seem to undermine the working
assumption of shareholder primacy, and the "privateness" of the corporation. If
"maximizing" is the goal: then maybe the state should get busy in structuring
arrangements that are proven to be most "maximizing."
In addition, it is not at all clear that the working notion of the firm as the private
property of its shareholders is "maximizing" overall. Again, the working hypothesis has
been that endorsing the "private" nature of the firm facilitates individual contracting that
maximizes wealth. Even if this is accepted on the level of theory, since utilitarianism is
fundamentally teleological, we shouldn't be most concerned with the theory, but with the
result.
It is simply unclear that current norms of shareholder primacy, and the
conception of the firm as the private property of the shareholders, does in fact
"maximize." If we care most about making firms most profitable, then we should be
ready to endorse any means available to do so. The American model is not clearly the
answer. Studies in comparative corporate governance or political economy do not
support the idea that it is the definitive answer to maximizing anything, certainly. [See
Bernie Black's research suggesting that governance changes have little impact on firm
performance, as well as his recent international pieces assessing firm returns under
foreign governance regimes.]
In addition, research in the area of behavioral law and economics suggests that
individuals err systematically in making decisions that would maximize their utility. If
we want to maximize utility then, then the state should enact laws that seek to correct for
these biases. Of course, the alternative decisional frames that are regarded as errors to the
utilitarian economist may in fact be alternative value preferences (such as for fairness or
justice norms - which in the corporate context might play out as reductions in income
inequality or greater opportunity for the expression of minority viewpoints). If we care
most about maximizing "utility" (and one would assume that this means maximizing it
across the broadest range of persons), there reason to believe that legal reform of existing
corporate arrangements is warranted.
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Part II Liberalism. It is more plausible that the notion of the "private" firm rests
on political biases rather than positive, objective economic principles. That is, it is argued
herein that the belief in the private nature of the business corporation is a particular
variant of political liberalism, and libertarian liberalism in particular - more than it is the
result of objective or inevitable market forces or economic principles. We have settled on
the belief that American corporations are private actors out of the same sensibility in
which we laud the private rights, the private life of real, human individuals. We endorse
the private nature of the corporate legal person because the idea of the "private"
corporation speaks to our political consciousness, our concern for the maximization of
liberty, of freedom of action, as much as to economic principles related to the
maximization of utility.
Within the American political imagination, the private firm is a bulwark against
state-based coercion and tyranny. This can be seen as a variant of the Jeffersonian belief
in the liberating power of personal property. We like the idea of corporations as a "free"
agent. The concept of "freedom" in the notion of free markets means just this: it is the
foil to governmental tyranny or coercion, not just a statement about the wisdom (in a
utilitarian sense) of minimal regulation. The "free market" idea is rhetorically powerful:
we hope to be freed by freeing the corporation. We hope for the independence that we
imagine may come with wealth. Within the American political construct we rely on a
constitution to protect our most cherished rights; we don't perceive the need to be
protected from the "private" corporation.
Put simply, the contractarian, privatist norm at the heart of the utilitarian
corporation is not well supported in empirical terms -- a major shortcoming for a
teleological theory. From the perspective of libertarian liberalism, however, the firm is
"private" because constructing it thus. legally, jibes with our broader philosophical and
political aspirations to freedom. Or, at least, this is true at first blush.
What is the inheritance of libertarian liberalism, if one sees current corporate
arrangements in this light? First, libertarian liberalism has bequeathed to us a corporation
in which corporate management is afforded a truly staggering degree of discretion to
detennine both the immediate substance of corporate policy and action, as well as the
vision or larger objectives of such action. Although contractarians and law and
economics scholars take the primacy of shareholders for granted, the law in fact does not
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necessarily, or at most only very loosely supports this viewpoint. The corporation as
liberal actor maximizes the freedom of its managers to make whatever choices appear
"best" for the firm, without specifying, in most instances, precisely why any decision was
consistent with shareholder (short or long term) value. Corporate fiduciary law had
already, in effect, given managers the discretion that the so-called "other-constituency
statutes" purport to afford managers by legislative fiat. Absent some foolhardy decision
on the part of management to deny even the potential for long term, indirect economic
benefits to the firm and the shareholders, managers' decisions are unassailable, based on
the "business judgment rule." [See Ford v Dodge Motor Company, where Henry Ford
practically begged to have the court find againstr him in determining he had stepped
beyond the allowable range of managerial discretion -- in that case in relation to dividend
policy.]
Corporate fiduciary law imposes certain minimalistic process-based limitations
on managerial conduct. As a function of the duty of loyalty, management cannot help
themselves to corporate assets (i.e. compensate themselves) "under the table," or in
private -- the duty of loyalty imposes a constraint on secret-profit taking. Managers
cannot act on an uninformed basis in their decision-making, consistent with the duty of
care. They also have the obligation to establish and maintain internal information
gathering and reporting systems that will produce the data necessary for good
governance. Of course, neither the duty of care, nor the duty of loyalty or any other
fiduciary duty says anything about what the "good" of good governance is. There is little
if any vision of "the good life" of the American business corporation within corporation
law - this would be "anti-liberal," of course.
Within the theoretic construct of libertarian liberalism, corporations are
autonomous, individual actors, to be governed by management accordingly. The state has
given corporations speech rights, so managers can elect to make them speak; there is,
moreover, no narrow limitation (within fiduciary law or elsewhere) that the speech must
be directly related to corporate business affairs. Similarly, the law has facilitated (or
failed to delimit) the entrenchment of political power in the hands of corporate
management. It is only in this moment that Congress is considering limiting the soft
money corporate donations that have allowed management to manipulate federal election
laws. On the matter of corporate charitable contributions, once again, corporations -which is to say their managers -- are free to act, or not to act. The law allows
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corporations to make charitable contributions, or not, with very little in the way of
constraint. The law corporate management extraordinary discretion in determining what
benefits to afford employees. The law affords corporations to elect to make widespread
disclosures to shareholders and the market of information about the treatment of
employees, environmental safety compliance, product safety compliance, workforce
safety compliance, political and charitable contributions, inter alia: but neither
corporation law nor even federal law mandate such disclosure. The expectation of
transparency that accompanies state action, does not apply to firms -- on the notion that
they are "private." The byproduct of libertarian liberalism's "freeing' the corporation has
been to "free" management to pursue (or fail to pursue) its own, relatively individualistic
vision of the place of the corporation within society and its responsibilities (or lack of
responsibilities) thereto.
What might it mean if corporation law were to take the liberalism more
seriously? Alternative, less "libertarian" and more "egalitarian" models of liberalism
might have different import for corporation law. For example, mechanisms of
shareholder voice could be significantly improved. Current corporation law pays lip
service to notions of shareholder free choice and autonomy. This is evident in the state
statutes' provisions for shareholder voting, for example. It is reflected, furthermore, in
corporate fiduciary law's proscription of managers' "entrenching themselves in office" in
the face of a valid offer to acquire corporate control; in the "fiduciary duty of disclosure"
line of cases that appears to validate norms of shareholder (informed) free choice. These
same concerns are also evident in the line of cases that requires managers to demonstrate
"compelling justification" for interfering with the shareholder franchise.
However, upon closer look, it becomes evident that American corporation law
has failed to deliver on principles of (egalitarian) liberalism, both in relation to the
establishment and facilitation of democratic mechanisms of governance and otherwise.
There are substantial impediments on shareholders' individual rights to pursue derivative
actions. The occasions for shareholder voting within state law are frequently highly
attenuated: in most states shareholders have no right to call a special meeting by
operation of law, and may act by written consent without a meeting only on the basis of a
presence of an extraordinary proportion (e.g. a supermajority or even unanimity) of
shares voted. The stated doctrine that managers can interfere with a shareholder vote only
upon ":compelling justification" has been diluted down in its subsequent application by
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the courts. And American corporation law has never fostered robust worker
representation, either through board representation for labor or the extension of fiduciary
duties (on the part of managementO to labor. (See comparison with German codetermination.) ...
Part III Communitarianism and the Power of the Leeal Counselor.
[Discuss how open ended nature of corporation law provides lawyers who would
counsel boards of directors and executives the opportunity to address matters of ethical,
philosophical and political import, in addition to legal and economic matters.]
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